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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In  Switzerland  as  well  as  in  the  European  Union  postal  market 
liberalization is a current issue. The reserved area has been the traditional 
means to finance the provision of the Universal Services. Absent a reserved 
area other means of funding are needed. If the universal service obligations 
(USO) are delegated to one or more postal operators, compensating them is 
an  important  issue.  There  are  two  problems  to  solve:  First,  the  cost  of 
universal  service  obligation  needs  to  be  estimated;  second,  the  universal 
service provider(s) (USP) has to be reimbursed. Our paper mainly deals with 
the former of these issues. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the background and 
motivation  for  calculating  the  cost  of  the  USO  and  analyses  the  new 
regulations of the European Community (EC) in this regard (2008/6/EC). 
The EC follows a disaggregated approach by instructing Member States to 
calculate the total net cost of the USO by summing the net costs arising from 
the specific components. Section 3 discusses the limits of this approach and 
advocates a global view which takes into account the dependencies between 
individual components of the USO. These considerations are complemented 
in Section 4 by an econometric assessment of the net cost resulting from 
obligations concerning the postal outlet network in Switzerland. A cross-
section dataset of the postal outlet network is analyzed and the difference 
between  a  disaggregated  and  a  global  approach  is  illustrated.  Section  5 
concludes.  
 
2.  CALCULATING THE COST OF THE USO – THEORETICAL 
CONCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTATION IN THE EC-
DIRECTIVE 
Universal service is a major concern in the postal market and faces great 
attention throughout the liberalization processes in Europe and elsewhere. 
Thereby, the USO requiring affordable and uniform prices directly conflict 
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with the notion of competition. Similar considerations apply in the case of 
the scope and quality of universal services  
Hence, one basic challenge for policy makers is to ensure the fulfillment 
of USO while providing an environment that offers a prosperous base for 
effective and welfare improving competition with consumers‟ choice over a 
great variety of fairly priced products based on an efficient service provision 
by postal operators. If the USO constraints are economically binding, the 
market  would  not  provide  the  universal  services  as  requested  and  thus 
market interventions (regulation) become necessary. Thereby, at least one 
operator has to be obliged to provide the universal service or parts of it
1 and 
it is crucial to correctly compensate the designated universal service provider 
(USP) to avoid distorting competition. Hence, it is important to know the 
associated burden of those operators providing the USO. 
2.1  How to calculate the cost of the USO 
In recent years, many contributions have been published on the issue of 
how to calculate the “cost” or “burden” of the universal service obligation. 
So far, three basic approaches have been developed and applied to the postal 
sector.  All  of  them  address  different  questions.  Figure  1  provides  an 
overview. See also Oxera (2007) and Dietl et al. (2007) for a more detailed 
treatment of the three approaches.   
A first approach referred to as Net Avoided Cost (NAC) compares the 
profit levels of a provider with and without universal service obligations 
whereas revenue effects are neglected. Hence, NAC approaches do not take 
into  account  the  effects  of  competition.  Instead  they  aim  to  identify 
unprofitable service parts of a given operation. NAC makes sense in a world 
of monopolies where policy makers like to know the incremental costs of the 
imposed obligations. The study of Nera (1998) undertaken for the European 
Commission is one such example. Hence, NAC is of little value in a fully 
opened postal market, as the USO affects the market equilibrium in various 
ways. For example an USO requiring price uniformity or increasing the costs 
will affect the pricing of both the USP and the other market players. This 
will result in different market equilibria with different markets shares and 
profits. 
A second approach called Entry Pricing was presented by Rodriguez et 
al. (1999). It compares the USP‟s profit in a regulated monopoly scenario 
with its profit with the same obligations under competition. The difference is 
referred to the “cost of liberalization” as it predicts the change in the USP‟s 
profit caused by opening the market.
2 However, in a liberalized market, this 
is again not the relevant measure as it does not compute the burden that the 
USO imposes on the USP in the market.  Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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Figure 1: Potential approaches to calculate the cost of the USO 
 
Source: On the basis of Curien (2001)  
 
A third approach referred to as Profitability Cost, compares the USP‟s 
profit level in a liberalized market with and without the USO. Panzar (2000, 
2001) and Cremer et al. (2000) provide a theoretical foundation and/or apply 
it  to  the  postal  sector.  If  policy  makers  compensate  the  USP  by  this 
difference, the USP achieves the same profit as it would in the postal market 
without any obligations. Hence, the profitability cost approach provides the 
compensation that makes the designated USP indifferent whether to provide 
the USO or not. In other words, the approach aims to measure exactly the 
USP‟s “burden of the USO” or “the cost of the USO” in a liberalized market. 
Note  that  the  approach  requires  the  simulation  of  non-observed  market 
equilibrium (USO-scenario in an unregulated market and vice versa, both 
scenarios  starting  from  a  monopoly  situation).  Such  simulations  include 
changes in cost structures (due to obligations) as well as demand effects 
(customer loyalty, competitive effects of pricing restrictions)   
We  summarize  as  follows.  Estimates  of  the  cost  of  the  USO  aim  to 
provide policy makers with a measure of the extent to which the USP is 
worse  off  in competitive  markets  due  to  the  USO.  The  profitability  cost 
approach  is  one  approach  to  estimating  the  necessary  compensation  to 
equilibrate profits before and after entry for the Universal Service Provider. 
It  calculates  the  cost  of  the  USO  as  the  difference  of  the  USP‟s  profit 
between a scenario with and without obligations. By contrast, measures like 
the “cost of the universal service”, the profit or financial situation of the 
USP,  the  “Net  Avoided  Costs”,  or  the  “costs  of  liberalization”  do  not 
provide  guidance  to  derive  the  financing  need  to  ensure  the  USO  in 
competitive markets. 
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2.2  The European Directive: “Net Costs” 
In  2008,  the  European  Parliament  issued  a  third  postal  directive 
(2008/6/EC).  Annex  I  gives  the  Member  States  guidance  as  for  how  to 
calculate the “net cost of universal service obligations” (in short “net costs”): 
”The net cost of universal service obligations is any cost related to and necessary for 
the operation of the universal service provision. The net cost of universal service 
obligations is to be calculated, as the difference between the net cost for a designated 
universal service provider of operating with the universal service obligations and the 
same postal service provider operating without the universal service obligations. 
The calculation shall take into account all other relevant elements, including any 
intangible and market benefits which accrue to a postal service provider designated to 
provide universal service, the entitlement to a reasonable profit and incentives for cost 
efficiency.” 
The  first  paragraph  seems  to  consider  mainly  cost  related  aspects. 
However, the net costs are defined twice and differently:  
Net Costs = Cost of US provision  
Net Costs = Net Costs (USO) – Net Costs (No USO) 
The second paragraph introduces “all other elements” – in particular the 
demand side – into the calculation of the net costs. The paragraph appears to 
imply that both benefits as well as opportunity costs (e.g. foregone revenues) 
should be included into the calculation. Moreover, the definition includes 
elements  of  rate  of  return  regulation  (“appropriate  profit”)  as  well  as 
incentive regulation (“incentives for cost regulation”). 
Net Costs = NC (USO) – NC (No USO) + “all other elements” 
Hence, Annex I in principle ,may allow calculations according to the 
profitability cost approach, i.e. a calculation of the cost of the USO that takes 
into account the competitive effects of introducing asymmetric obligations to 
selected market participants in a comprehensive and consistent way.  
However, Annex I further states that the “net costs” should be computed 
individually for the various USO elements. The various components of the 
USO  shall  be  calculated  separately  and  “summed  up”  avoiding  double 
counting”:  
“The calculation of the net cost of specific aspects of universal service obligations is to 
be made separately and so as to avoid the double counting of any direct or indirect 
benefits and costs. The overall net cost of universal service obligations to any 
designated universal service provider is to be calculated as the sum of the net costs 
arising from the specific components of universal service obligations, taking account of 
any intangible benefits.” Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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In  the  next  section,  we  illustrate  the  problems  involved  with  such  a 
separation  and  conclude that a  global approach  like  the  profitability  cost 
approach should be applied to estimate the cost of the USO. 
 
3.  NEED FOR A GLOBAL APPROACH – A STYLIZED 
EXAMPLE 
We show by means of a stylized example that the disaggregated EC-
approach to calculate the net cost of the USO may not be appropriate if not 
complemented by a global approach. Instead, all parts of the USO should be 
considered jointly to capture the various direct and indirect effects involved. 
Starting from such a global approach, the share of each individual dimension 
of the USO can be calculated backwards. This is an inherently difficult task, 
as will be illustrated in the figures below.  
We assume that the USO consists of two dimensions only
3 and has no 
revenue  effects.
4  In  Figure  2  (left  side)  the  vertical  axis  represents  
restrictions on the product/service ( S)  and  restrictions  in  pricing  on  the 
horizontal axis (P). Then, the square with the black border depicts the total 
“cost” of the universal service provision in its current scope defined as SUSO 
and  PUSO.  The  white  area  is  the  total  “cost”  of  a  reduced,  non-binding 
universal  service  provision  defined  in  a  way  the  USO-operator  can  just 
realize it‟s optimal business strategy in both dimensions like there had been 
no  obligation  (S*  and  P*).  The  grey  area  (the  difference  between  the 
bordered and the white area) would then be the net cost of tightening the 
USO in both dimensions. 
In  Figure  2  (left  side)  a  slackening  of  the  USO  with  respect  to  the 
services range (vertical dimension, arrow 1) results in a decrease in total cost 
by the lightly shaded area. A subsequent slackening with respect to pricing 
(horizontal dimension, arrow 2) results in an additional decrease of net costs 
by the dark shaded area. Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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Figure 2: Cost attribution to individual USO elements is arbitrary 
 
 
As  Figure  2  (right  side)  illustrates,  a  change  in  the  sequence  of 
slackening the USO in both dimensions results in a different attribution of 
net cost, while the difference in total cost remains unaffected. If only the 
restriction with respect to pricing would be slackened, the total net cost of 
the USO would decrease by the (now larger) dark shaded area. A subsequent 
change in the scope of the USO with respect to products results in lower 
total net costs by the (now smaller) lightly shaded area.  
A comparison of Figures 2 and 3 indicates that the total net cost of the 
USO is equal to the sum of the net costs attributed to different dimensions 
separately only if done in a consistent and well sequenced way. This is due 
to the interdependence between these dimensions. Note that a change in the 
sequence in the slackening of USO dimensions results in a different cost 
attribution.  Hence,  if  such  interdependencies  exist,  the  attribution  of  net 
costs of the USO to its single dimensions is arbitrary and hence of little 
added value.  
The example further shows that the bottom-up method described in the 
Annex  I  of  the  new  EU  directive  in  postal  services  is  problematic. 
Calculating the various restrictions independently of each other either results 
in an under- or overestimation of the total cost of the USO. As illustrated in 
Figure 3 (left side), double counting is a problem if the net costs of the 
obligations  are  computed  separately  based  on  actual  universal  service 
restrictions  in  the  other  dimension(s).  However,  if  the  net  cost  of  each 
dimension is calculated based on a scenario with no obligations otherwise, 
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Figure 3: Separate approach results in over- or underestimation of the 
cost of the USO 
 
Note  that  high  universal  service  requirements  make  the  net  costs 
attributed to the interdependency of the various universal service dimensions 
a substantial part of the cost of the USO. Figure 4 illustrates this argument: 
Very weak obligations in only one dimension imply that also the cost of 
strong obligations in the other dimension is low. Strong obligations in both 
dimensions,  however,  may  result  in  large  overall  costs,  as  illustrated  in 
Figure 4.
5 
Figure 4: Importance of interdependencies in net cost calculations  
 
An economically sensible calculation of the net cost of the USO should 
be  based  on  a  global  approach  with  the  status  quo  as  a  reference.  The 
problems associated with the EU calculation procedure mentioned above can 
be dealt with in two different ways: 
 (1) Sequential approach: A summation of the different cost dimensions 
is  only  possible  with  a  well  defined  sequence  of  slackening  obligations. 
Then, the additional net cost savings due to the slackening of an additional 
dimension  can  be  interpreted  as  this  dimension‟s  net  cost.  However, 
changing  the  sequence  will  result  in  different  net  cost  attributions  (cf. 
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difference in each dimensions attribution in Figures 2 and 3). Note that a 
correct  application  of  such  a  sequenced  approach  requires  both  the 
simulation of a market equilibrium with all USO dimensions together (first 
sequence) as well a simulation with no USO at all (last sequence). These are 
exactly the two scenarios needed when applying a global approach.  
(2)  Adjusted  separate  approach:  The  net  costs  associated  with  single 
dimensions are calculated by comparing hypothetical scenarios with only 
one dimension being slackened at a time (cf. Figure 3, left side). This way, 
the  net  costs  of  different  dimensions  are  comparable  among  each  other 
which might be important in the political process when the USO is defined. 
As illustrated, summed up they do not yield the true net cost of the USO; 
double counting has to be eliminated as specified in Annex  I of the EC 
postal directive. Similarly, one can start from a scenario with no USO at all 
and add one obligation at a time (cf. Figure 3, right side). Doing so yields an 
underestimation of the cost of the USO as the interdependencies between the 
various obligations are not considered. The only way to calculation of the 
various  interdependencies  in  both  cases  is  the  application  of  a  global 
approach  requiring  the  calculation  of  two  scenarios  –  one  without  any 
obligation and one with all obligations at the same time. Hence, computing 
the  net  cost  of  the  individual  constraints  provides  no  added  value  for 
calculating the total net costs and could well be let aside from the beginning. 
Note that both approaches require a global approach, whereby a directly 
applied global approach exhibits the lowest number of scenarios to compute. 
In the next section, we further illustrate the limits of the EC approach by 
analyzing the net costs of selected regulations concerning the Swiss postal 
outlet network. 
4.  CASE STUDY: SWISS POSTAL OUTLET NETWORK 
We illustrate the need for a global USO cost calculation by a case study 
on Swiss Posts post office network.  In 2004, the Swiss postal regulatory 
body PostReg published new regulations concerning the accounting system 
of  Swiss  Post.  The  primary  aim  was  to  define  the  extent  to  which  the 
reserved services could be used by Swiss Post to finance the post office 
network. Among others, the regulations required Swiss Post to define its 
“optimal” post office network. Up to the year 2007, in-depth discussions 
between the postal regulatory body PostReg and Swiss Post were held about 
the optimal size of Swiss Post‟s postal network which would be in place if 
there was no USO. PostReg finally defined the optimal post office network 
to consist of 700 post offices run by Swiss Post and 1000 agencies run by 
third parties (cf. Figure 5,  compared to about 2320 post offices and 150 
agencies at the end of 2007). Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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The  mix  between  agencies  and  post  offi ces  reflects  that  Swiss  Post 
would – without any obligations – provide postal services in about 1700 
postal  outlets  and  financial  transactions  in  about  700  outlets.  Hence,  the 
parties agreed on the assumption that outlets providing postal services only 
would be operated more efficiently by agencies compared to post offices (we 
verify this assumption in section 4.2). 
4.1  Disaggregated Approach: Estimating the USO costs separately 
For  simplicity,  suppose  that  Swiss  post‟s  USO  only  consists  of  the 
provision of (a) 2,467 access points (outlets) for postal services only and (b) 
a basic set of payment transactions. We now analyze the two obligations 
separately from each other. 
Under these assumptions, obligation (a) alone would result in a burden 
for Swiss Post amounting to the net cost of 2467-1700=767 access points. 
Assuming that the closure of 767 access points would have no effects on the 
demand of postal products (Buser et al., 2008), the associated savings would 
be the fixed costs of 767 agencies. Depending on the contract details with 
franchisees and the mix between fixed and variable costs the net cost would 
be in the range of  CHF 0 (contracts with only variable remuneration) and 
CHF  7.67  million  assuming  a  maximum  fixed  cost  contribution  of  CHF 
10,000.
6 
On the other  hand, if Swiss Post only had the obligation to provide 
financial transactions (and no other obligations), this would imply no USO 
burden at all, as Swiss Post would offer those services in 700 post offices 
and adapt the other access points to the needs of postal services. Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
Page 10 
Summing up, the net costs of the two restrictions as defined in the EC 
directive  results  in  a  net  cost  close  to  zero.  This  would  be  easy  to 
compensate. However, in the following we argue that the real net cost of the 
two restrictions is significantly higher. 
4.2  Global Approach: Estimating the cost of different USO 
dimensions jointly  
Analyzing the net costs of the two restrictions simultaneously yields a 
different picture than analyzing them separately. The obligation to provide 
financial transactions has a significant and considerable impact on the costs 
of the obligation for providing a nationwide post office network if the same 
accessibility rules apply as for postal services. That is, a number of post 
offices can no longer be converted into agencies. To compute such potential 
“foregone savings”, we must know the cost difference between post offices 
and agencies exactly.  
To  compute  these  cost  differences  we  use  a  cross-section  dataset  of 
Swiss  Post‟s  outlet  network  with  information  about  the  applied  business 
models (post office or agency) and the associated total costs, about several 
output  characteristics  (e.g.  collected  mail  volumes,  number  of  financial 
transactions) as well as regional characteristics. After a general outline of the 
idea and the corresponding literature, we specify the model and describe the 
applied  econometric  method.  The  results  of  our  estimation  enable  us  to 
compute the impact of the constraints on Swiss Post‟s cost structure.  
4.2.1  Background 
Total costs of a post office depend highly on the underlying business 
model. We distinguish between traditional post offices, run by Swiss Post, 
and agencies. The latter are run by franchisees, typically grocers or other 
established retailers and take advantage of splitting the fixed costs of their 
existing  infrastructure  across  various  products  beyond  postal  services. 
Furthermore,  they  meet  changing  consumer  needs  by  extended  opening 
hours and the offer of various other products. From a business perspective, 
agencies are most suitable to meet the obligation of providing a nationwide 
post office network. However,  they have the serious disadvantage are not 
being  capable  of  providing  financial  transactions,  because  these  call  for 
expensive security and anti-money-laundering measures. In other words, the 
agency business model is inappropriate to comply with the corresponding 
obligation. Hence, the obligation of providing financial transactions affects 
the obligation for providing a nationwide post office network, such that a 
combined restriction emerges out of these two single obligations. 
We  are  therefore  primarily  interested  in  the  differences  of  the  costs 
emerging from post offices and agencies in order to calculate the impact of Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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this  implicit  constraint.  To  estimate  them,  we  control  for  variable  costs, 
some other attributes and the underlying business model. The estimators for 
the  business  model  and  the  corresponding  differences  in  such  product 
delivery  attributes  (e.g.,  in  opening  hours)  then  denote  exactly  the 
differences in the costs. 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  this  is  a  new  approach  to  provide 
empirical evidence of the existence of combined restrictions of regulatory 
obligations  in  postal  markets.  We  do  not  address  efficiency  differentials 
within the two categories of postal outlets, post offices and agencies. The 
issue that historical post office networks are often operated on an inefficient 
level has been discussed in several earlier scientific papers. The most recent 
studies are those by Doble (1995), Cazals et al. (2002), Filippini and Zola 
(2005), Cohen et al. (2008), and Buser et al. (2008). 
Doble (1995) sought to establish technical inefficiency of UK post office 
counters  using  data  envelopment  analysis,  applied  to  data  from  1989 
covering  1291  counters.  It  was  found  that  technical  efficiency  could  be 
significantly  improved  by  making  more  efficient  use  of  labor inputs  and 
reducing  average  waiting  times.  Disparities  were  found  in  regional 
efficiency  and  it  was  hypothesized  that  these  differences  were  due  to 
differing  working  practices,  turnovers  of  staff  and  local  labor  market 
conditions.  
Cazals et al. (2002) have dealt with the estimation of cost elasticities of 
front-office activities. They distinguished between post offices according to 
their size, and noticed that returns to scale are relatively high on average in 
small post offices, while they are constant on average in large post offices. 
They further pointed out that over-capacity in front-office activities decline 
when the post offices become larger.  
Filippini  and  Zola  (2005)  estimated  a  Cobb-Douglas  cost  frontier 
function for a sample of post offices in Switzerland and found empirical 
evidence for economies of scale. Their results suggested that efficiency gains 
could have resulted from merging smaller post offices operating in the same 
service area or in small adjacent service area.  
Cohen et al. (2008) illustrated that many (historical) post office networks 
lacked the alignment to competitive needs. The authors showed that both 
Italy and the United States had a disproportionate percentage of their post 
offices located in rural areas as compared with banks (IT) or pharmacies 
(US) and found it likely that the distribution of post offices had a similar 
pattern in most postal administrations.  
Buser et al. (2008) contribute to a better understanding of post office 
network optimization programs and identify several key strategic issues. The 
authors conclude that diversifying into financial services helps to sustain a 
comparably larger and “classic” post office network based on the counter Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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concept. If no such option is available, the substitution of traditional post 
offices  by  agencies  run  by  third  parties  seems  to  be  the  only  long-term 
solution under competition. In either case, economies of scope play a vital 
role for sustaining self-financed access points for postal services.  
4.2.2  Model Specification and Econometric Methods 
In our econometric model we explain total costs as a function of the 
main outputs such as mail and control for opening hours, costs of physical 
capital, business model, and regional characteristics.  
We incorporate five outputs, namely  mail (Q1), parcel (Q2), payment 
transactions (Q3), account management (Q4) and sale of optional products 
(Q5). The output of mail is calculated as a sum of the number of letters 
collected. The output of parcel is a term of wider comprehension: Due to 
similar processes, the number of parcels collected is added to the number of 
items to be picked up at the post office by the clients. The output of payment 
transactions  can  be  understood  analogously:  The  volume  of  incoming 
payments  is  added  to  the  volume  of  disbursements.  The  fourth  output, 
account  management,  is  the  number  of  account  openings  (closings)  and 
related  consulting  services.  The  last  output,  sale  of  optional  products,  is 
measured by the sales volume of non-postal products as for instance mobile 
phones, prepaid cards, tickets or stationary. 
The total number of opening hours (OH) is an important cost driver in 
post offices. In agencies, this variable takes the value of zero, as additional 
opening hours do not increase the compensation of the franchisee. As the 
number of opening hours exceeds the time necessary to handle mail, parcels 
and payments, we interpret it to some extent as a fifth output in terms of a 
public service. We do not multiply this number by the number of counters 
for  the  following  reason:  post  offices  with  more  than  one  counter  avoid 
running  the  additional  ones  unless  demanded,  and  demand  is  taken  into 
account by the four output variables. 
We control further for the price of physical capital (PC) for post offices, 
measured by rental fee per square meter (ratio of the rental fee and rented 
surface area). For the same reason as for opening hours, this variable takes 
the value of zero for agencies. One might think of the labor price as another 
input factor. We did not consider this, because this price is set by a collective 
labor  agreement  and therefore  does  not  vary  significantly  over  units  and 
regions. 
The cost structure of a  post office depends highly  on the underlying 
business  model.  As  mentioned  above,  we  distinguish  between  traditional 
post offices and agencies. Agencies are only 5% of total postal outlets. They 
vary substantially in processed volumes. We introduce three dummies for 
agencies (A1, A2 and A3) to represent these differences in type and size: A1 is Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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set to 1 for agencies among the 1‟000 “biggest” offices, A2 if ranked between 
the 1‟001 and 2‟000 and A3 for the remaining ones. The reference consists of 
the traditional post offices. 
In addition, three dummies (R1, R2 and R3) are included to control for 
regional  effects  among  post  offices.  They  represent  peri-urban  areas, 
peripheral rural areas, and alpine tourist centre regions. The reference region 
consists of urban centers and agglomerations.
7 Again, these variables take 
the value of zero for agencies. 
The resulting specification of the cost function can be written as: 
C = C (Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, OH, PC, A1, A2, A3, R1, R2, R3)  (1), 
where the dependent variable C represents total annual costs and the 
independent variables are defined as above. 
For the cost function, a quadratic functional form is used. Given our data 
set, this form is advantageous due to the occurrence of zero outputs for cash 
payments in the agencies. Other forms like Cobb-Douglas or translog would 
require  extensive  additional  adjustments  for  instance  through  Box-Cox-
transformations  because  logarithms  are  not  defined  for  non-positive 
arguments. 
The estimated cost function is: 
Ci = β0 + β1Q1i + 0.5β11(Q1i)
2 + β2Q2i + 0.5β22(Q2i)
2+ β3Q3i 
+ 0.5β33(Q3i)
2 + β4Q4i + 0.5β44(Q4i)
2 + β5Q5i + 0.5β55(Q5i)
2
 
+ βOHOHi + βPCPCi + δ1A1i + δ2A2i + δ3A3i   
+ γ1R1i + γ2R2i + γ3R3i + εi  (2) 
with i = 1, 2, …, N, where subscript i denotes the post office or agency; 
N  is  the  total  number  of  post  offices  and  agencies;  and  εi  contains 
unobserved factors. All the independent variables are normalized, namely, 
they are replaced by their deviations from their respective median values. 
Estimators of the quadratic values are multiplied by 0.5 in order to directly 
interpret the corresponding effects of the derivate. The estimation method is 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) in which the error term (εi) is assumed to be 
identically and independently distributed across all outlets. 
4.2.3  Data 
The data was observed in the year 2006. It consists of a cross section of 
a total of 2‟467 postal outlets, subdivided into 2‟349 post offices operated by 
Swiss Post and 118 Agencies, run by franchisees.
8 80% of these agencies Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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belong to the category A3, representing agencies with little quantity, 17% to 
A2 and only 3% to A1. About half of the post offices and agencies are located 
in the regions R1, R2, R3 as defined above and the other half in the reference 
region, namely, in urban centers and agglomerations. 
The  various  units  cover  a  wide  range  of  outputs and  costs. They  all 
collect  mail  and  parcels,  whereas  financial  transactions  and  account 
management are not offered by agencies. The outputs are quantified by the 
number of collected items or executed transactions except opening hours, 
which  are  measured  by  hours  per  week.  The  opening  hours  changes 
eminently with the underlying business model, whereas the price of capital 
varies considerably among large cities and rural regions. 
Interestingly, the median value of the dependent variable, C, lies above 
the mean value, whereas the reverse is true for the independent variables 
except OH. 
4.2.4  Estimation results 
We have estimated the model as explained in Equation 2 for the sample. 
The results are listed in Table 1. Note that the numbers should be treated 
with caution. Due to the cross-sectional data we are not able to control for 
individual heterogeneity emerging from variations in the size of post offices. 
Further, we did not scrutinize possible differences in variable costs between 
post offices and agencies.  
Apart  from  one  regional  dummy  (R1),  all  independent  variables  are 
highly  significant  and  exhibit  the  expected  sign.  The  F-test  for  overall 
significance  is  highly  significant.  Furthermore,  no  multicollinearity  is 
existent in the data. 
All five output coefficients show the expected sign and are of reasonable 
size.  The  coefficients  of  the  squared  output  variables  indicate  increasing 
returns to scale for mail and parcels, decreasing returns to scale for financial 
products, and constant returns to scale for third party products. The values 
for Pc an OH show that parts of the cost differences among post offices can 
be explained by higher renting costs and longer opening hours. R1 exhibits a 
coefficient with an unexpected sign: Post offices in peri-urban regions seem 
to exhibit lower costs than those in urban regions. 
We are particularly interested in the coefficients for the agencies. The 
negative signs show that operating agencies generates considerable savings. 
The values further indicate that the associated savings increase with the size 
of the agency. In the next section, we demonstrate how we calculate the 
effect of a combined restriction by means of the coefficients for the agencies. Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
Page 15 
 
Table 1: Estimation Results 
Variable Coeff. se t P > t
Mail Output (Q 1) 0.50 0.04 13.65 0.00***
0.5*(Q 1Q 1) -6.21E-08 9.21E-09 -6.75 0.00***
Parcel Output (Q 2) 19.06 0.69 27.43 0.00***
0.5*(Q 2Q 2) -3.05E-05 3.03E-06 -10.08 0.00***
Payments Output (Q 3) 7.83 0.22 35.54 0.00***
0.5*(Q 3Q 3) 4.04E-06 4.42E-07 9.15 0.00***
Account Output (Q 4) 390.18 45.51 8.57 0.00***
0.5*(Q 4Q 4) 3.92E-01 1.77E-02 22.22 0.00***
Optional Products (Q 5) 0.94 0.12 7.66 0.00***
0.5*(Q 5Q 5) 8.77E-08 1.90E-07 0.46 0.64***
Price Capital (P C) 5892.83 772.12 7.63 0.00***
Opening Hours (OH) 17667.70 815.41 21.67 0.00***
Agency (A 1) -782401.29 178924.73 -4.37 0.00***
Agency (A 2) -290926.84 72671.68 -4.00 0.00***
Agency (A 3) -179475.47 40802.08 -4.40 0.00***
Region (R 1) -46082.09 15091.61 -3.05 0.00***
Region (R 2) 35638.48 23880.95 1.49 0.14***
Region (R 3) 295190.98 46477.15 6.35 0.00***
Constant 1674553.84 11467.08 146.03 0.00***
Overall-F Test: F (18, 2'448) = 13'087; P > F = 0.00***
N=2'467 significant at the 10% level ***
values normalized (not CHF) significant at the 5% level ***
significant at the 1% level ***  
 
4.2.5  Computing the cost of the combined obligations 
Our estimation results enable us to compute the costs of the implicit 
combined  restriction  that  emerges  for  Swiss  Post  from  the  two  single 
obligations to provide (a) a nationwide post office network and (b) payment 
transactions in every office.  
If only obligation (a) for itself had to be satisfied, nothing would argue 
against replacing  post  offices  by  agencies to  exploit  economies  of scope 
between  postal  products  and  third-party  infrastructures,  be  it  in  grocery 
stores  or  other  retail  businesses.  However,  obligation  (b)  of  providing 
payment  transactions  in  every  access  point  presupposes  extensive 
investments in security devices and structural adjustments (counter concept). 
Furthermore,  it  calls  for  staff  familiar  with  banking  business  and  anti-
money-laundering measures. In other words, obligation (b) affects the cost Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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of obligation (a) in a significant way as it prevents Swiss Post from replacing 
post offices by agencies. The issue is how large are those foregone savings? 
The coefficients of the agencies (δ1, δ2 and δ3) give a first indication. 
They  give  notice  to  two things:  First, replacing  common  post  offices  by 
agencies reduces total costs by a considerable amount (negative sign of δ). 
Second, the associated savings increase together with the size of converted 
post offices, indicated by the larger coefficients for “bigger” agencies. 
Computing the direct effect of the implicit constraint between (a) and (b) 
on the cost of the USO requires more precise calculations based on equation 
(2)  using  the  coefficients  from  Table  1.  Such  a  calculation  presupposes 
detailed knowledge about the optimal number, location, and nature of postal 
outlets as well as how the former output Q1-5 of closed or converted post 
offices disperses into other outlets to consider the scale effects as measured 
by β11-55. This is a fairly complex task and lies beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
Based on the optimal post office network as defined by PostReg (cf. 
Figure  5)  and  applying  a  more  simplified  approach  neglecting  scale 
economies and revenue effects yields foregone savings of over CHF 200 
Mio.
9  The  amount  lies  approximately  in  the  region  of  the  amount  as 
announced by PostReg
10 and is significantly higher than the costs derived 
from the separate approach in Section 4.1. 
The example demonstrates the existence of  interdependencies between 
various  restrictions.  Obligations  (a)  and  (b)  should  not  be  considered 
individually but jointly because (a) is affected by (b) and vice versa. 
 
5.  Calculation and compensation for effects of competition 
In Section 4 we computed the direct effect of two interacting universal 
service obligations on the burden of the USO. Thereby, we did ignore effects 
resulting from competition in a liberalized postal market. For example, if the 
state decided not to compensate the USP for its USO burden at all, the USP 
would need to finance those costs by a comparably higher price. This would 
have  an  immediate  impact  in  the  market  as  the  USP  would  lose  market 
shares.  Similarly,  if  USO  obligations  change  variable  costs  and  are 
compensated  by  fixed  subsidies,  the  incumbent  will  find  different  prices 
optimal. Hence, indirect effects, which increase (or decrease) the burden of 
the  USO  might  arise  if  (direct)  costs  of  the  USO  are  not  properly 
compensated  for.  Differences  in  the  USP‟s  perceived  net  operating  costs 
affect  equilibrium  prices,  market  entry  strategies  chosen  by  competitors, 
market shares, profits, and hence again (and indirectly) the cost of the USO. Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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Related to such indirect effects, the theory – as discussed in Section 2 – 
states that an estimation of USO costs should be derived by comparing two 
scenarios, namely one with and one without USO under market conditions.  
We now illustrate the extent of such indirect effects by a stylized market 
entry  model  as  described  in  the  Appendix  and  show  that  a  proper 
compensation arising from a “corrected separated approach” is a complex 
task. We argue that a global approach is – despite the complex calculations 
needed – easier to implement in practice.  
Table 2 provides the results for the model in the Appendix assuming that 
(i) operator i is mandated with USO obligations, (ii) operator j behaves as a 
competitive fringe (pj*=c), (iii) the USO constraints do not include pricing 
constraints, and (iv) have no effects on customer loyalty but (v) increase 
variable costs by 0.1 and fixed costs by 100. This stylized world allows us to 
isolate the indirect effect on the burden of the USO of a change in the USP‟s 
cost  structure.  Note  that  the  absolute  values  in  Table  2  serve  as  an 
illustration only and are unrelated to the postal market. 
Table  2  illustrates  the  effects  of  various  compensation  schemes.  In 
column 1, the government pays the USP a two-part subsidy consisting of 0.1 
per  mail  piece  and  a  fixed  component  of  100.  In  such  a  way,  the  USP 
behaves as there would be no USO obligations. This exactly restores the 
market  equilibrium  without  any  obligations  and  the  policy  hence  is 
competitively neutral.  
In column 2, the government pays ex post a lump sum compensation that 
it derives from a net avoided cost approach. The policy results in higher USP 
prices (subject to the 0.1 higher variable costs) which reduce its market share 
and  affect  profits.  Despite  the  USP‟s  slightly  improved  profit  situation 
(before  compensation)  it  is  worse  off  as  the  government  does  not 
compensate for the indirect effect of about 30. Bottom line, the USP is worse 
off by these 30.  
 
Table 2: Indirect effects and optimal compensation schemes 
  Two-part USO 
compensation 
Bottom up lump 
sum compensation 
Global lump sum 
Compensation 
       
Profit i Base Case  364.3  364.3  364.3 
Profit i with USO  -50.0  -21.4  -21.4 
qi    3142.9  2571.4  2571.4 
       
Total Compensation  414.3  357.1  385.7 
Price Level  1.08  1.13  1.13 
       
Direct Effect on USP  414.3  357.1  357.1 
Indirect Effect on USP  0  28.6  28.6 
       
State Financing  414.3  357.1  385.7 
USP Net Burden  0  28.6  0 
Burden to the consumer  0  142.9  142.9 
Total Burden   414.3  528.6  528.6 Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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Column 3 exhibits a compensation derived from a global approach. In 
contrast  to  the  lump  sum  regime,  it  correctly  compensates  the  USP  but 
results  in  a  market  equilibrium  with  higher  prices  and  lower  welfare 
properties as compared to the two-party compensation.  
How do the results change if the USO exhibits not only higher costs, but 
also  restrictions  in  pricing  and  more  loyal  customers?  Similarly,  what 
happens  if  we  relax  the  assumption  of  a  competitive  fringe  and  allow 
operator j to behave in a strategic way as described in the Annex?  
We do not report our results here but summarize the findings. First, a 
two-part  compensation  scheme  does  not  anymore  ensure  a  correct 
compensation or competitive neutrality. The reason is that the effect of the 
USP policy on customer loyalty cannot be offset by such a compensation 
scheme  and  would  result  in  over-compensation.  If  there  is  direct  price 
regulation in addition, the indirect effects are even more complex and might 
result in under-compensation. The same problems arise with an ex post lump 
sum payment based on net avoided costs. The distortions of both methods 
can only be offset by applying a correction based on a global approach. Such 
a global approach is used in the global compensation scheme (column 3) 
which  can  still  be  applied  in  the  more  complex  setting  without  any 
adjustments.  
In other words, in a real world environment, compensation schemes 1 
and 2 (two-part, lump sum) result in poor measures that have to be corrected 
by a global approach.  
 
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Policy makers are interested in the net cost of the USO for a variety of 
reasons, including ensuring that the designated USP is not disadvantaged 
relative to competitors in liberalized postal markets. The profitability cost 
approach as discussed by Cremer et al. and Panzar yields an estimate of the 
necessary compensation, if any, to pay for the net cost of the USO. This 
approach calculates the cost of the USO as the difference of the USP‟s profit 
between a scenario with and without obligations. In this regard, the new 
postal  directive  (2008/6/EC)  allows  for  a  consistent  calculation  of  “net 
costs” based on the profitability cost approach. However, the directive also 
states that these net costs should be computed individually across the various 
USO elements so as to avoid double counting.  
The inherent problem arising out of such a disaggregated approach to 
calculating the net USO costs is the presence of various interdependencies 
among the individual USO elements. These interdependencies even scale up 
under competition. For example, the obligation to deliver letters nationwide Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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on a daily basis gives room for selective market entry if the USO further 
foresees that all letters have to be provided at a uniform tariff. In Section 4 
such  interdependencies  were  analyzed  by  an  econometric  case  study  of 
Swiss  Post‟s  outlet  network,  where  the  obligations  to  provide  financial 
transactions, as well as mail collection services, imply an efficient solution 
with a greater number of post offices relative to agencies than would be the 
case with only an accessibility constraint. Hence, accessibility obligations 
designed  for  postal  services  are  more  costly  if  financial  transactions  are 
included in the USO (which is the case in Switzerland). Consequently, the 
cost of this combined restriction is significantly higher than the costs derived 
from a separate approach. 
Any calculation of the cost of the USO should hence tackle the various 
interdependencies between elements of the USO in a consistent way while 
avoiding double counting. We showed by means of a stylized example that 
the profitability cost approach ensures such a correct estimate. It does so by 
incorporating all relevant aspects of the USO and competition in a global 
way. Moreover, we showed that a disaggregated approach as suggested by 
the EC involves in one or the other way the application of a global approach 
– be it implicitly in a “sequential approach” or explicitly in an “adjusted 
separate approach”. Otherwise, any disaggregated approach will result in an 
under- or overcompensation of the USP. In such a case, indirect effects on 
the market equilibrium would further increase the market distortions and un-
level  the  playing  field.  Thereby,  a  two-part  compensation  schedule  that 
allows for a mix between lump sum and volume dependent compensation 
will  mitigate  the  distortions  to  a  minor  extent  only.  Again,  a  global 
profitability cost approach is the only way to derive  a fair compensation 
correctly accounting for indirect effects. 
Concluding, the global approach provides consistent estimates of the net 
costs of the USO and it does so with a clear recognition of the joint impact 
of the multiple obligations in any given USO. The interdependencies across 
obligations, illustrated here for postal and financial services in Switzerland, 
should  not  be  hidden  by  separation  arguments,  but  rather  these 
interdependencies should be made as transparent as possible so that policy 
makers and the USP can understand the joint impacts and net costs of the 
multiple obligations imposed under a given USO.  
 
APPENDIX  
For our simulations discussed in Section 4, we use a Dixit-like approach 
to  model  price  competition  with  product  differentiation  and  assume  that 
there are no information asymmetries. See Trinkner (2008) for more details 
on the specification. A representative sender has quasilinear preferences with Cost of the USO – Need for a Global Approach 
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respect  to  money  and  faces  the  choice  among  two  competing  and  non-
collusive operators i and j charging price pi and pj respectively. We use a 
quadratic utility function which yields linear demand in quantities q:  
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The  higher  the  degree  of  product  differentiation  among  the  two 
operators, the closer to zero is parameter e. Parameters a and b determine the 
market size and the slope of the demand curve. Note that the slope of the 
demand curve in a given market is equal for both operators. Parameters ai 
will  allow  us  to  include  potential  benefits  of  the  USO  (higher  customer 
loyalty towards USO-operator). 
Profit maximization over a cost structure consisting of marginal costs c 
and fixed costs F yields the following reaction functions and equilibrium 
prices for the two operators: 
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We calibrate the model as follows. The operators face symmetric costs 
consisting of fixed costs of 500 and variable costs of 0.8. e is set to 0.75. If 
served only by operator i, consumers would demand 10000 letters at a price 
of 1 with a price elasticity of -0.5. For this initial situation, the following 
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Parameter  ai  influences  the  size  of  the  market  of  the  two  operator‟s 
services. By setting ai > aj, we can include effects that let customers prefer 
operator i over j in case operator i is designated as USP with obligations. 
Formally, we define x as the percentage of total demand the USP receives if 
operator j were to offer the same price for its services and yield  
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We allow for universal service obligations that have an effect the profit 
function of operator i in three different ways: Obligations might change the 
variable costs ci, the fixed costs Fi, and/or pricing pi
* by imposing certain 
restrictions on the incumbents pricing: 
 
). ( ; ;
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1  Ideally, this would be the most efficient operator. For more on the issue on designating 
procedures with an emphasis on tendering see Jaag and Trinkner (2008). 
2    Market entry models that (1) assess the sustainability of the postal USO in a liberalized 
market and (2) include a monopoly scenario as a benchmark implicitly provide such an 
estimate. Examples include Crew and Kleindorfer (2005). For Switzerland cf. Dietl et al. 
(2005), Trinkner (2008) and Jaag (2006). 
3   In  reality,  many  more  dimensions  interact.  An  intuitive  representation  in  three 
dimensions is provided by Ambrosini et al. (2006). 
4   In the calculations below, potential revenue effects are discussed as well. 
5   Depending on the structure of the interaction b etween USO dimensions, it may also 
result in a total net cost which is smaller than the sum of the individual net costs. 
6   We assume here that variable costs are the same for agencies as for outlets run by Swiss 
Post. 
7  Classification implemented by the Federal Office for Spatial Development. 
8  We had to exclude 7 of the post offices and 5 of the agencies due to missing values of 
total costs. 
9   Basically, we calculated the savings from post office closures as the difference between 
total costs Ci less variable costs as estimated in Table 1 for the five output categories. 
Thereby, we did not account for economies of scale (no additional savings from the 
increased  quantities  in  remaining  access  points)  and  revenue  effects  (i.e.  consumers 
chose a neighboring access point). Similarly, we computed the savings from conversions 
of  post  offices  into  agencies  as  the  sum  of  costs  not  incurring  in  agencies  (agency 
dummies, regional post office dummies, opening hours, and capital costs). 
10   Press Conference from February 4
th, 2008. 